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ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court has not yet examined several aspects of the death
penalty. One aspect is the ability for the state to forcefully medicate an incompetent inmate,
which may result in the inmate appearing competent for execution. While the Supreme
Court’ ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute an inmate who is incompetent, inmates
who would have had their executions vacated due to mental illness are executed because
the state can put them on an involuntary medication regimen. According to many experts,
involuntary medication regimens mask the affects of their illness instead of providing a
cure. Experts often refer to this practice as the “chemical straitjacket.” Because the effects
of antipsychotic medication, inmates may be sedated to a point where they appear
competent, but in reality, they are sedated to a point where their mental illness is still
present yet undetectable. As a result, placing condemned inmates on involuntary
medication regimens has the possibility to violate the inmate’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The intent of this thesis is to examine whether the Supreme Court has successfully
upheld its duty to promote a fair judicial system by allowing the medicate to execute
scheme to continue. Through the analysis of case law, law review articles, and the American
Constitution, this thesis will evaluate the treatment of condemned inmates who show signs
of incompetence. Through analysis, this thesis aims to raise awareness to an issue that, in
the opinion of this writer, deserves the attention of American courts and other governing
bodies.
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OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY

Despite the overall trend of almost all Western industrialized countries to eliminate
the death penalty and the strong resentment against it of many criminologists and legal
experts, the death penalty has shown no evidence of ending in the foreseeable future. While
there is no indication that capital punishment will end in the near future, the United States
Supreme Court has made significant strides in moving towards making the death penalty
less capricious in the way it is administered. These strides can be seen in such cases as
Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute
anyone who is mentally retarded,1 and Roper v. Simmons in which the Supreme Court ruled
that it is unconstitutional to execute anyone who is under eighteen years old at the time of
the offense.2 Another significant change to death penalty policy was the case Kennedy v.
Louisiana, in which the Supreme Court prohibited the use of capital punishment in a rape
case of a child when the child is not killed. Kennedy also ruled that only crimes that result in
the death of a victim can result in capital punishment, with the exception of crimes against
the state such as espionage or treason.3 However, the United States government has not
utilized the right to execute a person for an espionage related crime since the mid 1950’s in
the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.4

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)
3 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
4 Death Penalty Information Center, Federal Executions 1927‐2003 (2012)
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal‐executions‐1927‐2003
1
2
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Capital punishment is a facet of the American penal system that is established by the
language of the United States Constitution. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the death
penalty is defined as a “[s]tate‐imposed death as a punishment for a serious crime.”5 As
stated in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a person cannot be
“deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of the law.”6 To be “deprived of
life” is presumably a reference to the government’s ability to take an individual’s life
through capital punishment. The phrase “deprived of life” is one of the constitutional
foundations of capital punishment. The phrase supposedly gives the government the ability
to take a person’s life, as long as there is due process of the law.7 Due process is the right
established by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution that provides for
procedural and substantive fairness in the application of the law.
Another portion of the Fifth Amendment seems more explicit: “No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury.”8 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a grand jury is defined
as, “[a] body of (often 23) people who are chosen to sit permanently for at least a month—
and sometimes a year—and who, in ex parte proceedings, decide whether to issue
indictments.”9 Ex parte, in the preceding definition, refers to “of or from one side or party”

Black’s Law Dictionary 407 (7th ed. 1999)
6 U.S. Const. amend. V § 1
7 Adam S. Goldstone, The Death Penalty: How Americas Highest Court is Narrowing its
Application, 4 Crim. L. Brief 23, (2009)
8 U.S. Const. amend. V § 1
9 Black’s Law Dictionary 706 (7th ed. 1999)
5
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usually made without notifying the “adverse party”10. An indictment is “an accusation or
charge of the commission of an indictable offense, made by writing by a grand jury against
one or more persons upon evidence heard by the grand jury and presented under oath by
them at the instance, and by the authority, of the state or the government.”11 The use the
term “capital” is arguably the Framers’ consideration of the application of a death penalty.
As a result, it allows for the opportunity for certain acts to “fall into the category of capital
crimes.”12 Such capital crimes require indictment by a grand jury to be constitutionally
prosecuted.
The United States government functions under the political concept of federalism.
Federalism is the division of authority between the federal and state governments. The
Fourteenth Amendment is a central amendment in understanding how federalism works.
Like the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment also serves as an important
foundation for capital punishment. While the Fifth Amendment gives the federal
government the ability to ‘deprive” a person of his or her life13, the Fourteenth Amendment
makes such a practice applicable to state governments. The language of the Fourteenth
Amendment makes a specific reference to capital punishment at the state level. As
written,“[no] State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

Ballentines Law Dictionary (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 3rd ed. 2010)
11 Ballentines Law Dictionary (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 3rd ed. 2010)
12 Adam S. Goldstone, The Death Penalty: How Americas Highest Court is Narrowing its
Application, 4 Crim. L. Brief 23, (2009)
13 U.S. Const. amend. V § 1
10

3

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”14
In clear language, the Fourteenth Amendment refers to the state government’s
ability to deprive one of life. What distinguishes the Fourteenth Amendment from the Fifth
Amendment is the consideration of the methods to be used at the state level. As long as due
process is provided and the Eighth Amendment is not violated, a state government may
execute an individual according to the United States Constitution. Due process at the state
level is the same as at the federal level. Due process is used to provide procedural fairness
in the application of the law. Requiring due process in executions at the state level is
important because an overwhelming majority of all executions take place at the state level.
In addition to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, other portions of the United
States Constitution significantly affect capital punishment. One portion of great importance
is the cruel and unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment states
that, “…excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.[Emphasis mine]”15 Because death is arguably the harshest
punishment allowed, capital punishment and many of its facets have often been challenged
as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. The definition of cruel and unusual punishment
and what constitutes “excessive punishment“ is not fixed in time, but changes with evolving
social conditions.”16 This means that as American society matures, views on what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishments may change to include punishments that were
U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1
U.S. Const. amend. VIII § 1
16 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
14
15
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once considered permissible. An example of American views on cruel and usual
punishments can be seen in the case Roper v. Simmons. In Roper, the Supreme Court ruled
that executing individuals under the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual despite the view
in previous years that executing minors was not excessive nor cruel and unusual. Many
significant cases that affect death penalty jurisprudence have been decided on Eighth
Amendment grounds. An example is Ford v. Wainwright,17 in which the Supreme Court held
that executing the incompetent is cruel and unusual punishment.
In addition to the Constitution, case law also plays a large role in the administration
of capital punishment. One of the most important cases in death penalty jurisprudence is
Furman v. Georgia.18 Furman, decided in 1972, is significant because it is the only case in
American history that found the practice of capital punishment unconstitutional, resulting
in a de jure moratorium on capital punishment until it was reinstated in 1976. De jure, in
the above instance, means “by lawful right,”19 meaning that American law would not permit
the continuation of the death penalty in the way it was previously administered. Because
Furman abolished the way the death penalty was administered in previous years, Furman
was responsible for ushering in what some death penalty experts would refer to as the
modern period of the death penalty. 20
In Furman, William Henry Furman was sentenced to death for murder during the
commission of a felony. On a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
19 Ballentines Law Dictionary (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 3rd ed. 2010)
20 Robert M. Bohm, Deathquest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital
Punishment in the United States, 1-323 (Anderson ed., 4th ed. 2012)
17
18

5

Furman’s counsel argued that the death penalty was arbitrary and capricious in the way it
was administered. A writ of certiorari is a request from a higher court to a lower court
asking to send the record of the case for review. Furman’s counsel made a direct challenge
to the unfettered jury discretion used in capital cases. According to Furman’s counsel, such
unconstrained discretion constituted a violation of Furman’s rights guaranteed under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court ruled in
Furman’s favor, subsequently making the death penalty, as administered, unconstitutional.
As stated in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, “[Death] today is an unusually severe
punishment, unusual in its pain, its finality, and enormity.”21 The reaction to the Furman
decision was immediate and widespread, as many states began revising their death penalty
statutes in light of the decision.
The moratorium on imposing the death penalty did not last long. Executions were
found to be permissible in the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision of Gregg v. Georgia and
Profitt v. Florida.22 Condemned inmate, Troy Leon Gregg, petitioned for a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court claiming that Georgia’s death penalty violated the cruel and unusual
clause of the Eighth Amendment. The question the court considered was whether Georgia’s
post‐Furman death penalty statutes violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the Eighth Amendment. Georgia had made several amendments to its death penalty
statutes in response to the Court’s earlier Furman decision, including bifurcated trials and
expedited direct review to determine if arbitrariness played a factor in sentencing. The

21
22

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, (1972)
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)
6

addition of a bifurcated trial is presumably one of the most notable requirements for a
constitutional death penalty trial. A bifurcated trial in death penalty cases refers to having
death penalty cases separated into two separate and independent phases. The first phase is
a guilt or innocence phase, in which the jury decides if the respondent is guilty or innocent.
The second phase is a sentencing phase in which the decision of the punishment is made by
the judge with recommendation from the jury or in some circumstances by the jury. In the
second phase, aggravating and mitigating circumstances are weighed to decide if the guilty
person should receive death or a lighter sentence, such as life without opportunity of
parole. Furthermore, Gregg provided for new safeguards to ensure that arbitrariness did
not play a factor in sentencing. In determining if arbitrariness was a factor in sentencing,
the court must determine
“1. Whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and 2. Whether,
in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence
supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, and 3. Whether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and defendant.”23
The questions of arbitrariness are questions that the Georgia Supreme Court had to answer
on direct review. With these reforms, the Supreme Court found Georgia’s new death
penalty statute did not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg became one of
23

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)
7

the first persons to be sentenced to death after the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman.
The decision in Gregg had a tremendous influence on death penalty jurisprudence by
requiring death penalty statutes to provide guided discretion, bifurcated trials, expedited
direct appellate review, and proportionality review. Proportionality review is a process by
which states compare the circumstances of a case with other cases in which death was
sought. A lack of proportionality review can result in a reversal of a judgment, which has
happened in past instances.24 According to Dr. Bohm, “Its [proportionality review} purpose
is to reduce arbitrariness and discrimination in death sentencing.”25
The death penalty is also a unique aspect of the American penal system because of
its appellate process. One distinctive nature of the death penalty, as noted above, is
automatic appellate review. Almost all death penalty jurisdictions have granted automatic
appellate review of convictions and sentences in their post‐Gregg death penalty statutes.26
In addition to automatic appellate review, inmates can try to have their convictions
overturned through filing discretionary appeals. This may be done in one of two ways. The
first way is to file a petition for writ of certiorari. The higher court has discretion whether
or not to hear the case and to grant the writ. A writ is a court order. In addition, an inmate
can have his convictions or sentences overturned by filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is a legal action that requests that a prisoner be released
from custody because he or she is held unlawfully. Habeas corpus appeals are usually
Walker v. Georgia, 381 U.S. 355 (1965)
Robert M. Bohm, Deathquest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital
Punishment in the United States, 79 (Andrson, 4th ed. 2012).
26 Robert M. Bohm, Deathquest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital
Punishment in the United States, 62 (Anderson, 4th ed. 2012).
24
25
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reserved as a last resort appellate method. Also, the death sentence can be commuted
through clemency. Clemency, according to Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, is “a disposition to
forgive or be lenient in a punishment.”27 Clemency has been described as a “’fail safe’ in our
criminal justice system.”28 Executive commutation, a form of clemency, is a right held by
the President of the United States to reduce or vacate a punishment. In addition to
presidential commutation, a governor, in many states, reserves the right to commute a
sentence of a charge at the state level in his or her respective state.
While the death penalty has changed much since its temporary moratorium created
by Furman, it is essential to note that the United States is one of the few countries that still
practices capital punishment. Today, the United States is the only Western democratic state
to employ the death penalty. At the end of the Nineteenth Century, executions in Europe
became increasingly “rare.”29 Now almost all Western countries have abolished the death
penalty and many other countries have become abolitionists in practice. The United States
remains one of the only democratic countries with a practicing death penalty. Among the
other countries that still maintain a death penalty are Iran, North Korea, Japan, China, Saudi
Arabia and many more countries.30

Ballentines Law Dictionary (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 3rd ed. 2010)
Herrera v. Collins, 506, U.S. 390 (1993)
29 Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, and Supreme Court
Discretion to Consider International Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 909 (2005)
30 Death Penalty Information Center, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (2012)
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist‐and‐retentionist‐countries
27
28
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THE DEATH PENLTY AND MENTAL ILLNESS

While the Supreme Court did not address the issue of protecting the mentally insane
from execution until the 1980s, such bans have been an aspect of law brought from English
Common Law tradition.31 Despite the fact that such bans were present, many condemned
inmates were executed because of a lack of a uniform definition of insanity.32 While the
courts had tests such as the M’Naghten rule to find insanity, such tests were not as
straightforward as were those proving other mental illnesses such as mental retardation.
The Supreme Court did not generate such a definition for when someone was too mentally
ill to be executed until the 1986 case, Ford v. Wainwright.33
Ford is a landmark case because it was the first United States Supreme Court case in
the modern period of the death penalty that questioned whether the United States
Constitution permits the execution of an inmate who became insane while awaiting
execution. In Ford, the petitioner began to show evidence of delusions and paranoia while
on death row. Alvin Bernard Ford believed that he was the pope and that there was a
conspiracy by prison guards to bury dead prisoners within prison walls. Due to his
symptoms of mental illness, his counsel filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court to determine if the Eighth Amendment allows for the execution of a

Rhonda K. Jenkins, Fit To Die: DrugInduced Competency For The Purpose Of Execution, 20
S. Ill. U. L.J. 149 (1995)
32 Robert M. Bohm, Deathquest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital
Punishment in the United States, 88 (Anderson, 4th ed. 2012).
33 Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
31
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mentally ill inmate. At the time, Florida statutes did not provide adequate protection for
those inmates who began to show signs of mental illness on death row. Ford argued that
the execution of a mentally insane inmate is a violation of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Ford was the first case in which the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of executing the incompetent under the Eighth Amendment in
the modern period of the death penalty.
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court ruled that executing the incompetent
was a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. In
the majority opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshal wrote that it is cruel and unusual to send a
person “into another world, when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it.”34 In addition,
Marshal writes, “Execution serves no purpose in these cases because madness is its own
punishment.”35 As a result, executing the insane was found to be cruel and unusual by the
Supreme Court, binding all lower courts in the United States.
While the Supreme Court in Ford did not create a definition for insanity, they
created a standard for competency to be executed. Thus, The Supreme Court shifted the
focus in such cases from proving insanity to proving competency. The Court created a two‐
pronged test for determining competency for execution. As defined by Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion, a person is incompetent if “they are unaware of the punishment they
are about to suffer” and “why they are to suffer it.”36 A failure to satisfy either parts of the
two‐pronged test would result in a stay of the execution. As a result, Ford established a
Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
36 Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
34

35
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legal definition for competency as well as strengthened the procedural rights for inmates
on death row who suffered from mental illness. Any prisoner who makes a “substantial
threshold showing of insanity” is guaranteed a fair hearing to resolve the question of his
competency. 37
Ford is not the only instance in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
executing mentally ill inmates; the issue would again be addressed in the case Panetti v.
Quartermaster.38 In Panetti, the petitioner, who suffered from a long history of mental
illness, was on trial for a double homicide. Scott Louis Panetti, who showed symptoms of
schizophrenia, including extreme delusions, chose to defend himself at trial. Panetti’s
defense was “disastrous” and at trial, Panetti, taking on the persona of a cowboy,
subpoenaed John F. Kennedy and the pope to testify. During the trial, his wife testified that
he had in the past gone into psychotic episodes during which Panetti had buried valuables
outside to cleanse his home from possession from the devil. Despite his signs of
incompetence, a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
While awaiting his execution, Panetti was given a competency hearing. Despite his
symptoms of mental illness, an evaluation of Panetti by three psychiatrists appointed by
the governor found that Panetti was in fact competent to be executed. After exhausting all
other appellate methods, Panetti’s counsel filed a petition of habeas corpus to the United
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after finding jurisdiction, agreed to hear the
case.

37
38

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 339 (1986)
Panetti v. Quartermaster, 551 U.S. 930, 127 (2007)
12

In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court ruled in Panetti’s favor. They concluded
that executing Panetti in his mental condition was a violation of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. The court ruled that the determination of
competency cannot be left to the sole discretion of a judge with the help of mental health
experts and that a condemned inmate has the right to cross‐examine such claims. The
decision of Panetti also had a more far‐reaching effect on the execution procedures of the
mentally ill: Panetti also expanded the definition of incompetency. As stated by Dr. Bohm,
“The court held that it is not enough to consider only whether the death row inmate is
aware that he is going to be executed and why, without considering delusions that may
prevent him from comprehending the meaning of the punishment.”39
Panetti, who believed his execution was a conspiracy, would be found incompetent
under this new expanded definition because his delusions prevented him from having a
rational understanding of his punishment. Today Panetti remains one of the strongest
challenges to the execution of legally incompetent inmates. Pannetti reaffirmed the
provisions in Ford establishing the definition of incompetency to “an ultimately legal and
not solely medical determination.”40
Both Ford and Panetti have established the legal foundation for barring the
execution of legally incompetent inmates. As a result of these two cases, an inmate cannot
be executed if he or she cannot understand that his or her execution is imminent and it will
Robert M. Bohm, Deathquest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital
Punishment in the United States, 89 (Anderson, 4th ed. 2012).
40 Peggy M. Tobolowsky, To Panetti and Beyond - Defining and Identifying Capital Offenders
Who Are Too "Insane" to be Executed, 34 American Journal of Criminal Law 369, (2007)
39

13

be carried out as a result of the nature of his or her act. The state or federal government has
responsibility under these two cases to provide a fair hearing during which an inmate’s
competency and sanity can be determined. Competency has become an essential question
for judges in death penalty cases. Competency, unlike the jury question of being found not
guilty by reason of insanity, is determined as a matter of law by a judge. However, by
making the determination of competency a legal and not medical concern, other issues
have arisen. A notable issue involves whether inmates placed under involuntary
medication regimens fit under the Supreme Court definition of competency.

14

FORCED MEDICATION REGIMENS

The ability of a government to place an inmate on a forced medication regimen is a
security matter, but one of great controversy. A government has a responsibility to protect
an inmate or others from harm while also protecting the inmate’s right to due process.
Under due process, an inmate has a right for procedural fairness when placed on an
involuntary medication regimen. Whether an inmate has a constitutional right to refuse an
involuntary medication regimen is an issue American courts have addressed in several
cases. More specifically, the courts have gone into great detail to describe what procedural
safeguards are required by due process.
The foundation of this legal argument is found in the case Washington v. Harper.41 In
Harper, the respondent was serving a sentence for robbery. Walter Harper had a long‐
standing history of violence when he was not on antipsychotic medications. While
incarcerated, Harper was transferred to the Special Offender Center (SOC), an institution
for mentally ill inmates. While in treatment there, Harper refused to take his prescribed
medications. As a result, his physician medicated Harper over his objection in accordance
to SOC Policy 600.30. The SOC policy states that an inmate may be placed on an involuntary
medication treatment if the inmate suffers from a mental disorder and poses a likelihood of
injuring himself or others.

41

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
15

Harper sued the State of Washington, claiming that placing him on a regimen
without a judicial hearing is a violation of due process. According to Harper, his rights were
violated because he did not receive a judicial hearing before he was placed on an
involuntary medication regimen. At the level of the State Supreme Court, the case was
transferred into criminal Court because the Court believed the issue was criminal instead
of civil. The Washington State Supreme Court ruled against Harper. Harper then filed for a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court claiming that he did not
receive a fair judicial hearing before the treatment was administered.
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court held that the SOC policy was, in fact,
constitutional. The Supreme Court developed a two‐pronged test to determine if an
involuntary medication regimen is permissible. First the inmate must be “a danger to
himself or others” and second, the treatment must be in the inmate’s “best medical
interest.”42 If both of these aspects are satisfied, then the inmate can be medicated against
his will without violating due process because the decision was decided fairly and in
accordance with the law. However, Harper would not be the last case the Supreme Court
would hear on the matter. Two years later, in Riggins v. Nevada, the Court addressed some
of the implications of Harper.43
While Harper made it constitutional for the government to place an inmate on a
forced medication regimen, Riggins questioned the implications that such regimens would
have on the medicated inmate’s future judicial hearings. David Riggins, the petitioner, was

42
43

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
Riggins v Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)
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charged with capital murder. During his trial, he began showing signs of psychotic and
delusional behavior. As a result, he requested to be placed on the drug Mellaril, which he
was prescribed in the past. Mellaril is a brand name for the medication thioridazine, a
“conventional antipsychotic” that works “by decreasing abnormal excitement in the
brain.”44 Riggins’ counsel filed for a hearing to determine if he had competency to stand
trial. In an initial hearing, the judge determined that Riggins was in fact competent to stand
trial. Riggins’ counsel then moved to an insanity defense and requested that he be taken off
of his medication to show the jury his “true mental state.”45 The judge denied this motion
because a psychiatrist felt that he might regress into an unpredictable state and be “difficult
to manage.”46 The judge did not allow his insanity defense and he was convicted of capital
murder.
Riggins filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court to determine if
an involuntary medication regimen violated his due process rights at trial; i.e., if the
medication he was placed on violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair
trial because he was prevented from showing his “true mental state.” The Supreme Court
ruled in Riggins’ favor reversing and remanding the case for a new trial. The Court found
that the lower court did not properly demonstrate that the medicine was in the petitioner’s
best medical interest and that he was a danger to himself or others. Further, the Court
expanded the requirements of involuntary medication regimens. In order to be considered

National Center for Biotechnology Information, (May 16, 2011).,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0000584/
45 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)
46 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)
44
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fair, a treatment must be the “least intrusive method” and be “medically appropriate to
reduce the danger he poses.”47 Harper did not distinguish whether the medication was the
least intrusive method. The Court found that because forcibly injecting antipsychotic
medications into inmates “invades a person’s body” and because “the medication alters the
chemical balance of their brain” the treatment was “highly intrusive.”48Less intrusive
methods may include lowering the dosage of the medication prescribed.49 As a result,
Riggins made the requirements stricter for placing inmates on an involuntary medication
regimen, thus giving mentally ill inmates stronger rights under due process. Such rights
include the right against a highly intrusive procedure when less intrusive methods exist
and the right against being placed on a medication that is not medically appropriate.
Riggins would not be the last time the United States Supreme Court addressed giving
an inmate antipsychotic medications against his or her will. In Sell v. United States,50 the
Court examined the question of whether or not the Federal government could place an
inmate on an involuntary medication regiment for the sole purpose of rendering him
competent to stand trial. Charles Thomas Sell, a dentist with a history of delusional
disorders, was charged with several counts of mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money
laundering. Sell was initially placed on bail, but his bail was revoked when his delusions
worsened. While awaiting trial, Sell was videotaped trying to hire a contract killer to

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)
Vickie L. Feeman, Reassessing Forced Medication of Criminal Defendants in Light of Riggins
v. Nevada, 35 B.C.L. Rev 681 (1994)
49 Vickie L. Feeman, Reassessing Forced Medication of Criminal Defendants in Light of Riggins
v. Nevada, 35 B.C.L. Rev 681 (1994)
50 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)
47
48
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murder an FBI officer and was charged with one count of attempted murder. Sell then
requested a competency hearing and was found incompetent to stand trial. The United
States Center for Federal Prisoners placed Sell in a hospital where it could be determined if
Sell’s competency could be restored through the prescription of medication. While in the
hospital, Sell refused to take his prescribed medication and, during an administrative
hearing, was put on a forced medication treatment. At the hearing, the hearing officer
found that Sell’s delusions “could make him dangerous.”51 Sell appealed his regimen to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; the Court ruled that the medication
was the only way to treat Sell so a judge could find him competent to stand trial. On a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, Sell appealed the lower court’s
decision claiming his regimen was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court found that the constitution does permit
the involuntary medication of an inmate. In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court
established in what limited circumstances such a treatment is permissible. The Court
established three conditions. First, the “court must find that important government
interests are at stake.” Second, it must be concluded that the regimen would “significantly
further that interest.” Third, the court must find that the medication is “necessary to
further those interests.” Finally, the court must find that the drugs are “medically
appropriate.”52
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The Court was careful to include a description of what constitutes an important
government interest. A court will “most likely” turn down a petition for a forced medication
regimen because of the government interest condition.53 Such a government interest is
created by the need to prosecute someone for a “serious” crime, but the Court did not
define what a serious crime constitutes.54 To satisfy the second condition, a government
entity petitioning for an involuntary regimen must prove that the interests to prosecute
guilty offenders are significantly furthered. As a result, the court must show that the
medication “is substantially likely to render the defendant competent for trial.”55 With this
said, a court must also find that the defendant’s right to a fair trial is not impaired due to
the defendant’s inability to assist his own counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment rights include the “likelihood that medications will render the
defendant competent to stand trial, balanced against the likelihood that the medication will
cause side effects that will compromise the fairness of the defendant’s trial.”56 The third
condition specifies that the medication must be the “least intrusive”57 option to obtain the
desired result. The last condition is present to ensure that the medication is in the patient’s
best medical interest. The question of whether the medication is in the patient’s best
medical interest is decided by the judge who authorizes the involuntary medication
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treatment. With all of these conditions, the Supreme Court developed a test of higher
scrutiny to determine when a forced medication regimen is permissible.
As a result of the above cases, the government has a constitutional right to place an
inmate on an involuntary medication regimen. As decided in Sell, such a regimen is
permissible even if the medication results in the inmate’s restored competency.
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NEXUS OF FORCED MEDICATION AND EXECUTIONS

As stated in the Supreme Court case Furman, the death penalty is “unique.”58 It is
unlike any other punishment in the law with respect to its “finality and enormity.”59 As a
result, the death penalty must be afforded specific considerations when functioning with
other aspects of the law. With this taken into consideration, a practice of the law that is
constitutional in normal circumstances might be interpreted as unconstitutional in death
penalty cases.
Forced medication regimens are an example of a constitutional government practice
that might have different implications when applied to inmates facing capital punishment.
As stated in Ford, inmates may be found competent to be executed if the inmates are aware
of the “punishment they are about to suffer” and “why.”60 In addition, inmates can have
their competency restored by an involuntary medication regimen. However, the
implications of these two issues can become clouded when they are used in the same case.
The instance where involuntary medication regimens are used on a condemned inmate has
been referred to as the “medicate to execute scheme.”61
At the heart of the “medicate to execute scheme” are two fundamental questions:

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
60 Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
61 Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d (8th District 2003) (review of whether forced medications
restores competency in accordance to Ford), cert denied, 540 U.S. 832 (2003).
58
59

22

The first question asks, “Does the medication actually cure the
inmate of his or her illness instead of just masking the
symptoms?”
The second question asks “Is the medication is in the inmate’s
best medical interest if it allows him or her to be executed?”
Neither of these questions have been addressed by the Supreme
Court, thus allowing the “medicate to execute scheme” to be an
aspect of the American penal system.
There is much disagreement among experts about whether antipsychotic
medication does indeed achieve its intended purpose. Many experts claim that there have
been significant strides on the area of antipsychotic medications, resulting in the curing of
mental illness. Other experts feel that such medications sedate instead of cure the inmate.
Since the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of the mentally incompetent, the
constitutionality of forced medication regimens depends on whether the medication does,
in fact, cure the mentally ill inmate of his or her symptoms. If the medications are not found
to cure patients, then the Eighth Amendment is clearly being violated by the “medicate to
execute scheme.”
Proponents of the use of medication attest to its ability to cure patients of their
symptoms. Many believe that better medications allow for better care. As stated by Douglas
Mossman, M.D., an expert on forced medication regimens, “[m]ost patients who take
antipsychotic drugs need no longer endure chemical straitjacketing to get relief from their
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delusions, hallucinations and disordered thinking”62 The “chemical straightjacket” refers to
the effect some medications have of sedating patients to mask the severity of their
symptoms of mental illness. Yet Mossman, a strong advocate of the utilities of antipsychotic
medications, attests to antipsychotic medication’s ability to grant patients relief from their
delusions.63
On the other hand, opponents of medication’s reliability and effectiveness strongly
believe that medications do not grant relief from the symptoms of mental illness. Many
believe that antipsychotic medications “merely mask symptoms and do not provide a
cure.”64 As a result, an inmate on these medications cannot achieve Ford competency. The
use of these medications creates a risk that the resulting return to competency is only
“artificial” and that that an inmate “is no more competent than before the administration of
the treatment.”65
It is argued that antipsychotic drugs have a sedation effect that frequently
interferes with “the ability to think” and can result in a “clouding of consciousness, and
impairment of judgment.”66 Such side effects could result in the inmate’s appearance of
competence when, in reality, the inmate is just sedated to the point where his or her
Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the Chemical Straitjacket: The Legal Significance of Recent
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insanity cannot be detected. If so, forced medication regimens are a violation of the Eighth
Amendment because they allow for the execution of an incompetent inmate. This Eighth
Amendment argument was paramount in the case Perry v. Louisiana, in which medicate to
execute schemes were ruled unconstitutional in the state of Louisiana.67 In addition, an
inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment rights would be violated because the inmate lacks the
ability to help in his or her defense because of the medication he or she is placed on.
Several of the drugs administered to patients on involuntary medication treatments have
many potential side affects. One that may go undetected is memory dysfunction. Memory
dysfunction can be “devastating to the defendant’s fair trial rights” and as a result a
violation of the defendant’s Fifth, Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights.68
Furthermore, many experts question whether a forced medication regimen is, in
fact, in the patient’s best medical interest. As stated earlier, the government has the right to
forcibly medicate inmates if it is “medically appropriate.”69 Yet some believe a
contradiction arises when an execution date is set prior to a medication regimen being
applied. Once an execution date is set, a forcible medication regimen “ceases to meet the
constitutional requirement,” outlined in Harper thus turning the treatment into “a
degrading punishment unique to incompetent death row inmates.”70
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The above question was addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Singleton v. Norris.71 In Singleton, the appellant, Charles Singleton, was
convicted of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery. The State of Arkansas placed
him on a forced medication regimen after a medical review panel found him to be a danger
to himself and others. Singleton appealed the regimen to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals arguing, “The State could not constitutionally restore his Ford competency through
the use of forced medication and then execute him.”72 The state recognized that the
medication regimen did restore his Ford competency. The question the court did look at in
Singleton was whether such a medication regimen went against the inmate’s best medical
interest. The court ruled against Singleton, finding the application for such regimens
permissible after an execution date is set. In the majority opinion, Chief Judge Wollman
stated, “eligibility for execution is the only unwanted consequence of the medication” and
because the medication relieves his symptoms of psychosis, it is in the patient’s best
medical interest.
Singleton filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
but the petition was denied. As a result, the Supreme Court allowed the lower court’s ruling
to control. By not addressing the issue of medicate to execute schemes, the Supreme Court
of the United States allowed lower courts to decide if medicate to execute schemes would
be permissible in the lower court’s respective jurisdictions. The bottom line is that an
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inmate may be involuntarily medicated once an execution date is set if permitted by the
jurisdiction of the deciding court. Several courts, such as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Singleton, have allowed the practice of medicating inmates to restore their competency
to be executed. Many courts have taken an active role in abolishing the practice.
Louisiana v. Perry is a strong example of a court using its judicial authority to abolish
the practice of medicate to execute schemes.73 In Perry, the petitioner Michael Owen Perry,
who suffered from a long history of schizophrenia, was on trial for murdering five of his
family members in a criminal episode. Schizophrenia is “ a mental disorder, not necessarily
an impairment of intelligence, characterized by hallucinations, indifference, and delusions
of omnipotence and persecution.”74 While on trial, Perry was placed on a forced medication
regimen and found competent to stand trial. He, against the advice of his counsel, withdrew
his plea of insanity and instead pleaded not guilty. In 1985, Perry was convicted of five
counts of first‐degree murder and sentenced to death. In response, Perry appealed his
death sentence to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s decision, but ordered that his competency be evaluated. Perry was
transferred to a state facility where it was determined that he suffered from incurable
schizophrenia that “causes his days to be a series of hallucinations, delusional and
disordered thinking, incoherent speech, and manic behavior.”75 The mental health

State of Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La Supreme Crt. 1992) forcefully medicating
condemned inmates) rev’d 584 So.2d 1145 (1991)

73

74

Ballentines Law Dictionary (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 3rd ed. 2010)

State of Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La Supreme Crt. 1992) forcefully medicating
condemned inmates) rev’d 584 So.2d 1145 (1991)

75

27

professionals also determined that Perry was only competent for execution while on
medication. As a result, the state placed Perry on a forced medication treatment of doses of
the drug Haldol. Haldol, the brand name for the medication haloperidol, is a “conventional
antipsychotic” that is used to treat “severe behavioral problems” including “explosive,
aggressive behavior.”76 At this time in Perry’s case, the United States Supreme Court had
not yet decided Washington v. Harper, which outlined the procedures for placing inmates
on involuntary medication regimens. During Perry’s appellate process, the Supreme Curt of
the United States made a decision on Harper, establishing a procedure for determining
when involuntary medication treatments are permissible. Perry filed a petition writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, who after just deciding Harper, vacated and
remanded the case to the trial court. The trial court reinstated the forced medication
regimen, finding that Harper did not apply to this situation. Perry then filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari to the Louisiana State Supreme Court.
In light of the new provisions established in Harper, the Louisiana Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Perry, finding that medicate to execute schemes are unconstitutional in the
state of Louisiana according to the Louisiana Constitution. The court provided many
reasons why such a practice is unconstitutional. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court
considered the nature of medicate to execute schemes. The court ruled that that “forcing a
prisoner to take antipsychotic drugs to facilitate his execution does not constitute medical
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treatment.”77 Thus, placing an inmate on a forced medication regimen cannot be in the
patient’s best medical interest.
Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court looked at the Hippocratic Oath to
determine if doctors are permitted to place a condemned inmate on a forced medication
regimen. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that, “because the physician is required
by his oath to alleviate suffering and do no harm, the state’s order forces him to act
unethically.”78 Also, the court found that such a regimen, because of its degrading nature,
can be “analogous to torture.”79 To that end, the court ruled that “[w]hen antipsychotic
drugs are forcibly administered to further the state's interest in carrying out capital
punishment, and therefore not done in the prisoner's best medical interest, the intrusion
represents an extremely severe interference with that person's liberty.”80 The Louisiana
Supreme Court, in addition, found that the state lacked a compelling state interest to
medicate Perry against his will. Medicating a person to meet competency for execution is
not a compelling interest for the state and therefore does not allow the state to strip
someone of his or her rights for such a cause. The Louisiana Supreme Court also ruled that
medicate to execute schemes violate the right to privacy as established in the Louisiana
State Constitution. The Louisiana State Constitution reads, “Every person shall be secure in
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his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures or invasions of privacy.”[Emphasis Mine]81 While the right to privacy is
not specifically mentioned in the United States Constitution and is only established by case
law,82 the Louisiana State Constitution defines such a right for those in Louisiana. Medicate
to execute schemes violate the “right to control one’s own mind and thoughts.” The court
found that the intrusive measures employed by medicate to execute schemes violate the
right to privacy the Louisiana State Constitution was written to protect.
Lastly, the court ruled that such a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. In
the opinion, the court stated,
“The punishment is cruel because it imposes significantly
more indignity, pain and suffering than ordinarily is necessary
for the mere extinguishment of life, excessive because it
imposes a severe penalty without furthering any of the valid
social goals of punishment, and unusual because it subjects to
the death penalty a class of offenders that has been exempt
therefrom for centuries and adds novel burdens to the
punishment of the insane which will not be suffered by sane
capital offenders.”
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In the Perry decision, the Supreme Court of Louisiana abolished the administration of
medicate to execute schemes for all courts within its jurisdiction. While Perry is not legally
binding on courts outside Louisiana, it provided a strong model for many other courts to
follow. Such was the circumstance in Singleton v. State83
In Singleton v. State, the appellant, Fred Singleton (of no relation to Charles
Singleton from the case Singleton v. Norris) was sentenced to death for first‐degree criminal
sexual conduct, murder and other serious offenses. After exhausting several appeal
attempts, Singleton finally was granted appeal by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. One
issue the court considered was whether the state of South Carolina maintained the right to
medicate an inmate solely to restore his or her competency for execution. In order to
answer the above question, the Supreme Court of South Carolina used Louisiana v. Perry as
persuasive authority. The Supreme Court of South Carolina found many similarities in the
privacy clause of the South Carolina and Louisiana state constitutions. The South Carolina
Constitution had a privacy clause that reads, “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and
unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated.”[Emphasis Mine]84 Drawing from
the decision in Perry, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that “the South Carolina
Constitutional right of privacy would be violated if the State were to sanction forced
medication solely to facilitate execution.”85 Moreover, like the decision of Louisiana v. Perry,
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the South Carolina Supreme Court also included the roles of physicians in their analysis.
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the prescription of an antipsychotic
medication against the will of the inmate constitutes physician participation in executions.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned “the medical ethical position reinforces the
mandates of our constitutional law, which dictate that we prohibit” medicate to execute
schemes.86 Having medicate to execute schemes forces physicians to violate their ethical
responsibilities. In a unanimous decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court banned the
use of forced medication regimens to facilitate an execution in the state of South Carolina.
Since the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari in Singleton v.
Norris, the future of the abolitionist movement for medicate to execute schemes may rest in
the lower courts such as the Louisiana State Supreme Court. Yet as seen in the case
Singleton v. State, the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court can be further reaching than
its jurisdiction. The arguments proposed in Louisiana v. Perry provide sound persuasive
arguments for other jurisdictions to support banning the practice of executing an inmate
who is placed on antipsychotic medication treatments against his or her will.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Due to the unique nature of the death penalty, involuntary medication regimens
bring up constitutional considerations when applied to condemned inmates. Establishing
competency is an ongoing judicial function that, like all other judicial functions, must be
conducted in accordance to the United States Constitution and respective state
constitutions. When medicate to execute schemes are put into practice, many rights
guaranteed to inmates become compromised. Some of the rights that may be violated are
those guaranteed from the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that individuals be given “due
process of law” at both the federal87 and state88 levels. The Sixth Amendment provides for
the right to an “impartial” trial.89 Medicate to execute schemes may have the potential to
violate these rights. Many inmates wish to show their true mental state during competency
hearings. Being on antipsychotic medications may make it difficult for a judge to see an
inmate’s symptoms of mental illnesses thus making an inmate appear competent to stand
trial. As was the case in Riggins v. Nevada, a forced medication regimen may prevent an
inmate from showing his or her true mental state, thus violating his or her Fifth
Amendment’s due process rights.
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Medicate to execute schemes also have the possibility of violating one’s Sixth
Amendment rights. According to Elizabeth G. Schultz, this can happen in a variety of ways.90
One way is that forced medication regimens may interfere with a defendant’s right to
present a defense. Many of the medications used in involuntary medication regimens have
a sedation effect.91 Such a sedation effect may affect the defendant’s ability to help his
counsel present an accurate defense. In addition, Schultz argues that these medication
regimens can cause prejudice against a defendant. The effects of some antipsychotic
medications can make the patient unable to communicate and act naturally. These
unnatural actions may prejudice juries and violate the Sixth Amendment. These forced
medication regimens also interfere with the defendant’s right to testify in his or her own
words. Side effects of antipsychotic medications may also impair an inmate’s memory,
making it difficult for him or her to assist in his or her defense. Such a side affect has a
strong potential to violate an inmate’s rights under the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixth
Amendments.
In addition to the Fifth, Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, medicate to execute
schemes have the potential to violate the Eighth Amendment as well. As stated in Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Ford, the Eighth Amendment “prohibits the State form inflicting the
penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”92 The Supreme Court addressed this issue
with the need to establish competency, but the test for competency is “ambiguous” in
Elizabeth G. Schultz. Sell-ing Your Soul to the Courts: Forced Medication to Achieve Trial
Competancy in the Wake of Sell v. United States, 38 Akron L. Rev. 503, (2005)
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practice and “fails to recognize the unpredictable nature of mental illness and antipsychotic
medications.”93 In essence, not much is known about the role that antipsychotic
medications play in evaluating one’s competency.
One concern is that these medications do not cure symptoms, but only mask
symptoms. Many opponents of the policy of forcefully medicating inmates claim that the
medicated still maintain symptoms of mental illness, and that medications may only mask
these.94 Ronda K. Jenkins effectively makes this argument in her law review article, Fit to
Die: DrugInduced Competency For the Purpose of Execution.95 In this article, she describes
medicating an individual once an execution date is set as a “macabre, brutish ritual.” She is
not alone in her beliefs; Judge Gerald Heaney of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit used Jenkins’s article in his dissenting opinion in Singleton v. Norris.96
Heaney writes, “One of the pitfalls of equating true sanity with its medically‐coerced cousin
is that the drug‐induced sanity is temporary and unpredictable: ‘the effect of psychoactive
drugs on a particular recipient is uncertain; the drugs may affect the same individual
differently each time they are administered.’ Jenkins, supra at 170.”97 Both Jenkins and
Heaney strongly believe that antipsychotic medications have a tendency to mask symptoms
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instead of curing them, and that the underlying illness becomes almost impossible to detect
although the illness is ever‐present. There exists recorded evidence of inmates on
involuntary medication treatments who still experience the debilitating effects of their
mental illnesses.
One notable example of medications failing to cure the underlying symptoms of
mental illness can be seen in the executed inmate, Charles Singleton, from the case
Singleton v. Norris. Singleton was executed in 2004 despite his symptoms of schizophrenia.
In an interview with CNN, Singleton asserted that he heard voices. He claimed, "They talk
about, for example, 'Let's hold him and see when his father come. We'll have him and his
father.' They talk about ruling the world and finding a way to kill me."98 Even with evidence
mental illness, Singleton was found competent to be executed.
The Eighth Amendment protects citizens from cruel and unusual punishments and,
according to case law, the execution of incompetent inmates has been determined to be
cruel and unusual punishment.99 Even though medication may revive the patient’s
competency, symptoms of insanity may still be present, as were the circumstances of
Charles Singleton. Because symptoms of illness can still be present despite the prescription
of antipsychotic medications, medicate to execute schemes may be seen as cruel and
unusual punishment and also arguably a violation of the right to due process under the
Fifth Amendment.
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While it has been established that an inmate who is on medication may be executed,
there has been a lack of understanding of the mechanics by which these medications work
in treating illnesses. Because of the lack of understanding, questions arise as to whether
inmates on antipsychotic medications are relieved from illness to the point that they are no
longer incompetent. More specifically, inmates who are on such medications may
experience fluctuations in the medications’ ability to alleviate their symptoms based on
duration of the treatment and the normal mechanics of the body. Because of the
fluctuations of the human body, it may be uncertain that an inmate on an involuntary
medication treatment will be competent throughout the duration of his or her treatment.
As stated by opponents to the practice, “[t]he effect of psychoactive drugs on an individual
is uncertain; the drugs may affect the same individual differently each time they are
administered.”100 The uncertainty of the medication makes knowing whether an inmate is
competent at the time of their execution difficult and uncertain. Since knowledge about the
effects of these medications is lacking, it is cruel and unusual to execute inmates on forced
medication regimens until more information is available. Only after more evidence on the
effects of antipsychotic medications is collected can a government be certain that an inmate
is competent at the time of his or her execution.
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The nexus of forced medication regimens and capital punishment can also create
ethical violations, in addition to the constitutional considerations that arise. One profound
ethical consideration is the responsibilities of physicians who participate in such regimens.
Doctors, like many other professionals, are regulated by guidelines and oaths that affirm
that physicians will practice in accordance with an “appropriate standard of professional
ethics.”101 These standards are set forth in provisions from the American Medical
Association (AMA) and the Hippocratic Oath, an oath doctors take that “embodies concepts
of religions, integrity, ethics, and collegiality in the pursuit of medicine as a profession.”102
Both of these place strict restrictions on a doctor’s ability to participate in executions,
involuntary medication regimens, and the nexus of the two.
The Hippocratic Oath lies at the heart of the regulation of physicians’ participation
in executions. Upon becoming a physician, medical students swear, “I will prescribe
regimens for the good of my patients according to my ability and judgment and never do
harm to anyone.”103 The oath, and most specifically the section in which physicians swear
to do no harm “consistently and universally has been interpreted by medical societies to
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prohibit the participation of physicians in the infliction of capital punishment.”104 By
swearing to “never harm anyone” physicians are arguably barred from directly
participating in executions. As a result, physicians have an ethical responsibility to refrain
from any participation in an execution.
As a supplement to the Hippocratic oath, the AMA provides more specific guidelines
for a physician’s participation in an execution. The AMA is an organization of doctors and
medical students whose purpose is to further the interests of physicians and their patients,
as well as to lobby for legislation helpful to the practice of medicine. While doctors rely on
the state for licensure to practice medicine, the AMA has tremendous effects on the way
physicians practice medicine because of the active role the AMA takes in promoting
physicians’ interests. Doctors must comply with the rules of their state departments of
health because these state departments have the ultimate authority to revoke or suspend a
physician’s license. Despite this, many physicians abide by the recommendations of the
AMA because it creates a standard that many doctors follow.
The AMA openly opposes doctors participating in executions. The AMA code of
ethics specifically discusses executions and has dedicated a section to the issue. The code
states “[a]ny physician participation in execution is banned.”105 Unlike the Hippocratic
oath, which has been interpreted to ban physician participation in executions, the AMA, in
clear language, bans physician participation in executions. Armed with this, the AMA goes
into great detail to define an execution. According to the AMA an execution is defined as,
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“[1.] An action that would directly result in the death of the
condemned, [2.] An action which would assist, supervise, or
contribute to the ability of another individual to directly cause
the death of the condemned, [3.] An action that would
automatically cause an execution to be carried out on a
condemned prisoner”106
This definition is strict, preventing physicians from helping conduct an execution in
almost all possible ways. Most notable is the section that bans physicians from
participating in “an action which would assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of
another individual to directly cause death.”107 As a result, physicians are ethically excluded
from even helping select veins to insert needles for lethal injection.
The AMA goes further to describe what constitutes physician participation.
According to the AMA, physician participation,
“includes, but is not limited to, the following actions:
prescribing or administering tranquilizers and other
psychotropic agents and medications that are part of the
execution procedure; monitoring vital signs on site or remotely
(including monitoring electrocardiograms); attending or
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observing an execution as a physician; and rendering of
technical advice regarding execution.”108
In opinion 2.06, the AMA outlines practices that would be considered participation
and also provides for other actions to be included. Thus, the AMA establishes an ethical
consideration that prohibits physicians from participating in an execution. However, this
section of the AMA does not define whether placing a patient on a forced medication
regiment constitutes physician participation in an execution.
Like executions, the AMA details the provisions for physicians participating in
forced medication regimens in its code of ethics. AMA opinion 2.065: Court‐initiated
Medical Treatments in Criminal Cases describes provisions for when it is ethical for a
physician to prescribe a forced medication regimen. According to the AMA, “[p]hysicians
can ethically participate in court‐initiated medical treatments only if the procedure being
mandated is therapeutically efficacious and is therefore undoubtedly not a form of
punishment or solely a mechanism of social control.”109 Opinion 2.065 requires that the
treatment be used to better the patient’s medical condition and not be used as method to
restore the patient’s competency for execution. The AMA forbids the use of a medication
regimen as a “mechanism of social control.” A physician thus violates his or her ethical duty
to participate in an involuntary medication regimen when the patient’s medical condition is
not the sole purpose of the treatment.
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The AMA, in addition, addresses the ethical responsibilities of physicians during the
connection of involuntary medication regimens and capital punishment. In Opinion 2.06 of
the AMA code of ethics, the ethical responsibilities of physicians participating in medicate
to execute schemes are addressed: “When a condemned prisoner has been declared
incompetent to be executed, physicians should not treat the prisoner for the purpose of
restoring competence unless a commutation order is issued before treatment begins.”110 If
such a guideline is followed, then the execution of an inmate who is artificially competent
should never occur because physicians have an ethical responsibility to refrain from doing
so. Yet, this is not always the case, as can be seen with the execution of Charles Singleton.
Additionally, there is a question of whether a forced medication regimen can be seen
as a direct participation in an execution. If so, then a physician involved in such an act
violates opinion 2.06 of the AMA code of ethics that prohibits physicians from participating
in executions. According to Douglass Mossman, M.D. , “Some commentators suggest that the
physician can be directly responsible for an inmate’s death” when the physician places the
patient on an involuntary medication regimen that ultimately restores the inmate’s
competency for execution.111 Unfortunately, as seen in many scenarios, “[p]rotocol assigns
physician or nurse an essential role in the actual execution.”112 With this said, can a state
permit a practice that causes a physician to violate his or her ethical obligation?
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The above question was essential to the argument established in the case State of
Louisiana v. Perry. In Perry, the Louisiana Supreme Court abolished the medicate to execute
scheme for the state of Louisiana. Central to the court’s argument to justify the abolishment
of involuntarily medicating condemned inmates was the fact that medicate to execute
schemes are “contrary to the code of the American Medical Association.”113 Moreover, in
the case Singleton v. State, the Supreme Court of South Carolina outlawed medicate to
execute schemes in part because such schemes violate the ethical responsibilities
physicians owe to their professions.114 Because the Eighth Circuit did not consider the
ethical obligations of physicians, an “inherent” societal problem was created.115 Such a
practice is detrimental to the inmate‐patient relationship because it violates the inmate’s
trust that his or her physician is performing to the ethical standards of the medical
profession. According to Jennifer E. Lloyd, an expert on medicate to execute schemes, a
physician violating his or her ethical obligations by participating in executions can harm
society outside the prison walls. She states, “[T]he credibility of physicians is inextricably
linked to the medical profession’s ability to keep itself separate from activities that violate
the AMA.” In addition, the “cloud that physician participation casts over the medical
community as a whole unravels the fabric of the elite moral position with which society
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views its medical professionals.”116 The fact that forced medication regimens violate the
ethical responsibilities of physicians may create doubt that the physicians are performing
other medical practices in accordance with their ethical responsibilities. As a result, it can
be seen as a great error by the courts to allow forced medication regiments. Had the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of physicians’ ethics, it is likely that the court
would have reached a decision “more consistent with those reached by other courts.”117
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OPINION
In order to evaluate the worth of a practice, it is essential to weigh the benefits of
the practice against the detrimental effects. Allowing medicate to execute schemes to
persist does produce benefits to society. First of all, it allows those who have committed
capital crimes to be brought to justice. Execution is seen as a means of retribution to some
proponents of the death penalty. As noted in national opinion surveys, retribution is the
main basis for support of capital punishment.118 Retribution is defined as “the formal act of
a community against one of its members, and is carried out in the manner and for the
reasons that are justified under the political constitution of the community.”119 Thus, there
is justification for executing an incompetent inmate, regardless of the inmate’s mental
illness, because he or she committed a crime and should be punished.
In addition, medicate to execute schemes prevent the inmate from reoffending. By
executing an inmate, they are removed entirely from society, preventing them from
committing future crimes. Those placed on involuntary medication regimens are inherently
dangerous. To be placed on such a medication, one must pose a danger to himself or
others.120 Once these individuals are executed, they no longer pose any risk of harm. If
these inmates were to be kept incarcerated instead of being executed, there is an ever‐
present possibility that they will act out in violence towards themselves or those around
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them. Executing these inmates may be the only way to be sure that such harm will never
result.
On the other hand, medicate to execute schemes lead to many detrimental effects on
society. First of all, the constitutional violations created by medicate to execute schemes
are great. It can be argued that medicate to execute schemes can violate inmates’ rights
under the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixth Amendments. They do so by preventing an inmate
from aiding in his or her defense.121 In addition, involuntary medication regimens may
create a sedation effect that can cause prejudice during competency hearing.122
Along with the possible violations of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixth amendments,
medicate to execute schemes have a potential to violate the Eighth Amendment. As noted
earlier, the Eighth Amendment serves to protect citizens from “cruel and unusual
punishments.”123 English common law and United States case law establish that executing
the incompetent constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.124 There still exists the
possibility that antipsychotic medications do not cure a patient’s symptoms but instead
mask them.125 Also, there is doubt on whether the medications consistently alleviate a
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patient’s symptoms.126 In the case of either of these two scenarios, an incompetent inmate
may be executed, resulting in a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Finally, medicate to execute schemes place physicians in a position where they must
violate their ethical obligations. As stated in the AMA, doctors are discouraged from
participating in executions. Yet medicate to execute schemes require doctors to participate
in executions violating their ethical considerations established by the AMA and the
Hippocratic Oath.
When weighing the positive and negative effects of medicate to execute schemes, it
becomes obvious, in my opinion, that the negative effects outweigh the positive effects. As
stated by Justice Marshall, retribution “is not served by the execution of an insane
person.”127 Furthermore, the fact that medicate to execute schemes may compromise an
inmate’s constitutional rights and may cause doctors to violate their ethical obligations
outweighs the risk of the inmate endangering himself or others. Thus, reviving an inmate’s
competency for execution through an involuntary medication regimen goes against the
best interest of society.
In the opinion of this writer, more judicial action from the courts is needed. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana in Louisiana v. Perry provides a persuasive argument for other
jurisdictions to consider. If courts are to address the ethical obligations of physicians, then
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it is likely that they will move toward abolishing medicate to execute schemes.128 Hopefully,
a case that addresses medicate to execute schemes will reach the Supreme Court of the
United States. Even more strongly, this writer is convinced that the medical community and
its licensing agencies should penalize any doctor that participates in medicate to execute
schemes. Participating in medicate to execute schemes violates the very ethics physicians
promise to uphold. To this end, if a doctor participates in an execution in a prison, the
doctor should be stripped of his or her medical license and barred forever from practicing
medicine in any state. Yet until action is taken by American courts and state medical
licensing agencies, medicate to execute schemes will remain an unfortunate blemish on the
American penal system.
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